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Abstract 
 This paper investigates the impact of extending free school lunch to all students, regardless of 
income, on academic performance in New York City middle schools. Using a difference-in-difference 
design and unique longitudinal, student level data, we derive credibly causal estimates of the impacts of 
“Universal Free Meals” (UFM) on test scores in English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics, and 
participation in school lunch. We find UFM increases academic performance by as much as 0.059 
standard deviations in math and 0.083 in ELA for non-poor students, with smaller, statistically significant 
effects of 0.032 and 0.027 standard deviations in math and ELA for poor students. Further, UFM 
increases participation in school lunch by roughly 11.0 percentage points for non-poor students and 5.4 
percentage points for poor students. We then investigate the academic effects of school lunch 
participation per se, using UFM as an instrumental variable. Results indicate that increases in school lunch 
participation improve academic performance for both poor and non-poor students; an additional lunch 
every two weeks increases test scores by roughly 0.08 standard deviations in math and 0.07 standard 
deviations in ELA. Finally, we explore potential unintended consequences for student weight outcomes, 
finding no evidence that UFM increases probability of obesity or overweight, or BMI. Results are robust 
to an array of alternative assumptions about sample and specifications. 
JEL No. I24, I38, H52  
Keywords: School Food, Academic Performance, Free Lunch, Childhood Obesity 
Authors: Amy Ellen Schwartz, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University; 
Michah W. Rothbart, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University 
 
 
“Only one-third of public school students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch take part in the program. 
What is stopping them? Stigma.” 
- David Sandman, President & CEO, New York State of Health Foundation 
“What they’re offering people is a full stomach and an empty soul.” 
- Rep. Paul Ryan, 54th Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 
“Free meals should go only to those students who are eligible for free meals, and reduced-price meals 
should go only to students eligible for reduced-price meals. Other students should be eligible for neither. 
This obvious and commonsense point has been lost.” 
- Daren Bakst and Rachel Sheffield, Heritage Foundation 
I. Introduction 
The National School Lunch Program (NSLP) is the second largest nutrition assistance program in 
the U.S., subsidizing over 30 million meals each school day and costing $12 billion annually. A growing 
number of schools (and districts) have chosen to adopt Universal Free Meals (UFM) as an alternative, 
which provides free school lunch for all students, regardless of income. Advocates claim that UFM will 
reduce the stigma that limits participation, address food insecurity for needy students, improve student 
readiness to learn and reduce administrative burden. Skeptics argue that the benefits are insufficient to 
justify the additional cost and, indeed, UFM may be deleterious – increasing obesity, for example. The 
empirical research investigating these claims is, however, unfortunately thin, and there is no existing 
research providing credibly causal estimates of the impact of UFM per se. This paper begins to fill this gap, 
exploiting the conditionally random timing of the adoption of UFM by NYC public middle schools to 
estimate the effect of UFM on middle school student attendance and test scores as well as the impact of 
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lunch participation on student outcomes. Additionally, we investigate potential unintended consequences 
for obesity and weight outcomes. 
We use unique and detailed student-level data to estimate the impact of UFM on attendance and 
test scores, using a difference-in-differences design with student (or school) fixed effects and a range of 
student and school control variables. We then estimate the impact of UFM on participation in school lunch 
using unique student-level data on lunch transactions in schools with Point of Service (POS) tracking 
systems. This is the first use of such data that we are aware of and a significant improvement over survey 
data typically used in previous research. We then investigate the academic effects of school lunch 
participation per se, using UFM as an instrumental variable. Finally, we explore unintended consequences 
for student obesity. Thus, our analyses provide reduced form estimates of the impact of UFM on academic 
outcomes and school meal participation – particularly relevant for policymakers – and also on the effect of 
school lunch per se on academic outcomes.  
We focus on middle school students for three key reasons. First, middle school students are more 
likely to make autonomous decisions about lunch participation each day than elementary school students 
and are, therefore, more likely (than younger/elementary school students) to be price sensitive. Second, 
NYC subsequently expanded UFM to all middle schools, as part of a broader effort to address the 
difficulties of middle school aged children (and then to all public schools in the 2017-2018 academic 
year). Third, POS data coverage is sufficiently broad in middle schools to allow us to estimate the impact 
on school lunch participation and consequences for student outcomes, but is not as broad in elementary 
schools, which are typically smaller, resulting in limited statistical power to estimate impacts.1 
                                                                        
1 We exclude high school students from our analysis because students in grades 9 through 12 do not take a 
standardized ELA and a standardized math exam each year. High school students in New York State are required to 
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To preview our results, we find UFM increases academic performance by as much as 0.06 
standard deviations in math and .08 in ELA for non-poor students, with smaller, statistically significant 
effects of .032 and .027 standard deviations in math and ELA for poor students.2 Further, UFM increases 
participation in school lunch by roughly 11.0 percentage points for non-poor students and 5.4 percentage 
points for poor students. Instrumental variable results suggest increases in school lunch participation 
improve academic performance for both poor and non-poor students; an additional lunch every two 
weeks increases test scores by roughly 0.08 standard deviations in math and 0.07 standard deviations in 
ELA. Finally, we find no evidence that UFM increases obesity, overweight or BMI. Results are robust to an 
array of alternative assumptions about sample and specifications. Implications for policymakers 
considering expanding (or contracting) universal free meals programs are clear: UFM can be an effective 
tool to improve student outcomes. 
II. Background on National School Meals Programs and Universal Free Meals 
 
The national school meals programs (NSLP and the School Breakfast Program, SBP) provide free 
and low-cost meals to tens of millions of children each day, in over 100,000 schools and childcare centers 
nationwide. The NSLP is the second largest food and nutrition assistance program in the United States, 
trailing only SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). Together the Federal government 
spends approximately $15 billion a year on NSLP and SBP ($11.6 billion for the NSLP in 2012 and $3 
                                                                        
pass one Comprehensive English and one Mathematics Regents Exam in order to graduate, but schools and 
students choose the grade in which students take those exams. 
2 In this paper, we define the poor as those individually certified as eligible for free or reduced price lunch in any year, 
including certification through returned lunch forms or through family participation in other means-test programs 
like SNAP. We define non-poor as student not certified as eligible for free or reduced price lunch in any year, which 
would include a small set of students with low family income but who never return lunch forms, never participate in 
other means-tested programs, and, thus, are not certified as eligible for free or reduced price lunch. 
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billion for the SBP in 2011; compared to about $75 billion annually on SNAP) and subsidize 
approximately 44 million meals a day (31.6 million for the NSLP in 2012 and 12.1 million for the SBP in 
2011).3 
According to the USDA, the NSLP program "improves nutrition and focuses on reducing 
childhood obesity" (US Department of Agriculture Office of Communications, 2010). Nutritious school 
meals may also serve a supportive function for education by providing food to ensure that children are not 
distracted by hunger during class (Bogden, Brizius and Walker, 2012). That is, the programs serve 
multiple roles, including working to reduce child hunger and food insecurity, improving student health and 
well-being and, perhaps, getting kids ready to learn.4 
Established by the National School Lunch Act of 1946, the NSLP subsidizes low cost or free 
lunches for over 30 million children every school day. Traditionally, in public schools, lunch and breakfast 
are provided free to students with household income up to 135% of the Federal poverty line and at a 
reduced price to students with household income up to 185%.5 That is, individual eligibility for subsidies 
through the national school meals programs is means-tested. Schools certify student eligibility using 
student-returned “lunch forms” or “direct certification.”6 Federal regulations also provide schools and 
districts with the option of applying to implement UFM.7 UFM eliminates all fees charged to students to 
                                                                        
3 US Department of Agriculture, 2012, 2013. 
4 In addition, the NSLP provides an avenue for surplus food distribution, serving as a Federal farm subsidy. 
5 The thresholds for free and reduced price meals rely on Federal poverty lines, which are not adjusted by region. 
Due to cost of living differences across the country, a substantial portion of non-poor students living in high-cost 
places like NYC have real (regionally adjusted) incomes that would qualify them as free lunch eligible in a lower-cost 
district. Thus, many of NYC’s students not eligible for free or reduced price meals are, in a sense, “near poor”. 
6 Direct certification is a process of using municipal records on student participation in other means-tested poverty 
programs (such as eligibility for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF, and/or SNAP benefits) to certify 
individual student eligibility for subsidies. 
7 In order to continue receiving Federal reimbursements for meals served under UFM programs, schools must 
receive approval from their respective state agencies. Schools or districts must then pay the difference between 
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participate in the schools meals programs. That is, UFM makes school lunch and breakfast free to all 
students regardless of their income. 
UFM may increase meals participation through two key mechanisms. First, since UFM decreases 
the price of school meals for those students who are not free or reduced price lunch eligible to zero, it may 
increase participation through a substitution effect. Second, UFM may reduce stigma of participating in 
school lunch, which can, in principle, affect all students, and previous research has found significant stigma 
limiting participation among poor students in traditional public schools (Sandman, 2016). UFM may 
reduce stigma both by eliminating the differences in form (or amount) of payment often visible in cafeteria 
transactions and, potentially, by increasing the utilization rates of non-poor students. 
Federal regulations allow schools and districts to implement UFM under Provision 2 of the 
National School Lunch Act (42 USC 1759a), subject to approval from a state agency.8 Established in 
1980, Provision 2 reduces the burden of tracking meals served by student eligibility status to once every 
4 years. During the base year, a school establishes reimbursement rates based on the percentage of meals 
served by student eligibility status (free, reduced, or full-price meals). Reimbursement rates in subsequent 
years are then determined by base year percentages, such that schools only have to count the total number 
                                                                        
Federal reimbursement and the full cost of providing school meals. See US Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service (2002). 
8 Since 1980, schools where at least 80 percent of enrolled children are eligible for free or reduced price meals can 
also implement UFM under Provision 1. Since 1995, schools can also offer UFM under Provision 3, which sets 
reimbursement levels based on the average number of meals served by eligibility group in the most recent year in 
which the school tracked individual lunch utilization (rather than the average percentages by eligibility group, the 
method used under Provision 2). Under Provision 3, reimbursements are adjusted for inflation and enrollment, but 
not for changes in the number of meals served. Finally, since 2010, schools or districts can offer UFM under the 
Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) of the Child Nutrition Reauthorization Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 
2010 (HHFKA), which requires 40% of the student body be eligible for subsidies through "direct certification," 
verified through administrative records indicating student participation in SNAP and/or TANF. Under the CEP, 
reimbursement rates are based on the share of the school with direct certification (set as the free meal 
reimbursement rate times the share of students with direct certification, and then multiplied by a factor of 1.6). 
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of meals served per day and not track student eligibility. Following the four-year cycle, a state agency may 
approve continuation for another four years if the school provides evidence that student income levels 
remained stable. By law, the school is responsible for the difference, but -- to date – NYC has picked up 
this cost. Failure to comply with the regulations of Provision 2 or other components of the school meals 
programs puts schools at risk of losing Federal reimbursements for school meals. In this paper, we exploit 
variation in timing of the adoption of school UFM status under Provision 2 of the National School Lunch 
Act, focusing on students ever exposed to UFM. 
III.  Literature 
There is limited and mixed evidence on the effects of school lunch (or breakfast) on academic 
achievement. In part, this reflects the scarcity of data with direct measures of individual school meal 
participation and of data linking participation to student performance and socio-demographics. 
Moreover, disentangling the effect of school lunch per se from the effects of poverty (or low income) on 
academic outcomes is complicated by the direct relationship between school lunch and poverty that arises 
from the use of household income to determine eligibility for school meals subsidies.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, students who pay lower prices are more likely to participate in meals 
programs regularly (Akin, Guilkey, Popkin & Wyckoff, 1983). A handful of studies examine the effects of 
policies aimed at expanding access to school meals and find positive effects on education and 
achievement (Imberman & Kugler, 2014; Frisvold 2015; Hinrichs, 2010).9 Others that target increasing 
                                                                        
9 Imberman and Kugler (2014) study the impact of a free in-class breakfast program in a large urban school district, 
finding improved achievement, particularly among schools with high shares of students with low preprogram 
achievement and who qualified for free lunch. Frisvold (2015) studies the impact of policies that mandate school 
participation in the School Breakfast Program among schools with high shares of students eligible for free meals, 
finding the availability of the SBP increases National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test scores. 
Hinrichs (2010) exploits changes to the NSLP reimbursement funding formulas that make reimbursement more 
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nutritional and caloric content of meals also see improved test scores (Anderson, Gallagher & Ritchie, 
2017; Figlio & Winicki, 2005).10 Other studies find little effect of policies aimed at expanding access to 
school meals and increasing caloric content on test scores and mixed evidence on attendance (Leos-Urbel, 
Schwartz, Weinstein & Corcoran, 2013; McEwan, 2013).11 The effects may differ across studies for a 
number of reasons, including measurement error in parent surveys, omitted variables correlated with 
poverty and achievement, or differences in the policies and populations studied. Finally, heterogeneity in 
impacts may arise due to differences in the school or neighborhood context – depending, for example, on 
the cost and availability of alternative meal options.  
Turning to the effects of school lunch on student health, two key studies find that participation 
increases childhood obesity (Millimet, Husain, & Tchernis, 2010; Schanzenbach, 2009). Others find 
evidence that expanding the availability of and eligibility for school meals improves health outcomes 
(Bhattacharya, Currie, & Haider, 2006; Gundersen, Kreider, & Pepper, 2012). Still others find policies 
that increased access to school meals have no effect on obesity (Corcoran, Elbel, & Schwartz, 2016). 
Finally, Smith (2017) finds heterogeneity in the impact of school food on diet quality, with improvements 
                                                                        
generous, arguing that these funding changes may increase meals participation either by increasing the number of 
participating schools or by lower lunch prices. Hinrichs (2010) finds more generous reimbursement formulas 
increase number of years of completed education. 
10 Anderson et al. (2017) study the effect of schools in California contracting with healthier lunch vendors, finding 
student test scores increase, particularly among students eligible for free or reduced price lunches. Figlio and 
Winicki (2005) study school menus during testing periods, finding school districts in Virginia facing potential 
sanctions increase the caloric content of meals at a greater rate than others during the week of exams and providing 
some suggestive evidence this practice improves test scores. 
11 Leos-Urbel et al. (2013) examine the impact of universal free breakfast in NYC, finding increases in breakfast 
participation, but no detectible effect on test scores and only small attendance gains for only some racial/ethnic 
subgroups. McEwan (2013) estimates the impact of providing higher calorie school meals in rural Chile, finding no 
impact on test scores.  
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for students with greater nutritional needs and no positive effects (and if anything negative) for students 
with lesser nutritional needs.  
The evidence on the impact of UFM per se is even more limited. One notable exception is Kitchen 
et al. (2013), which examined a pilot universal free meals program in the United Kingdom (the UFSM 
program). Estimated effects were largely positive: most pupils (nearly 90%) took up free school meals, 
increasing participation both among those students who would otherwise be eligible for meal subsidies 
and among those otherwise ineligible. Further, UFSM shifted consumption from foods associated with 
packed lunches to those associated with hot meals and, importantly, improved academic attainment, 
especially among poor students and those with lower prior attainment. The UFSM pilot program, 
however, did not have significant effects on attendance, parent reports of student behavior or BMI, 
obesity and other health outcomes. 
A related literature has focused on the effects of universal free breakfast. Using school level data 
on participation, Leos-Urbel et al. (2013) find NYC’s implementation of universal free breakfast increased 
participation for all students, with the largest increases among those who would not have been eligible for 
free meals otherwise, but find little evidence of an impact on academic outcomes (either test scores or 
attendance). Others find small-to-moderate positive effects of universal free breakfast programs on 
academic achievement (Crawford, Edwards, Farquharson, Greaves, Trevelyan, Wallace, & White, 
2016).12  
                                                                        
12 Student participation in the SBP is much lower than the NSLP (Bartfeld & Kim, 2010). Impacts of UFM programs 
may vary with levels of utilization, perhaps with larger effects at low levels of participation. Moreover, impacts may 
depend upon which students are induced to increase their participation and the relevant alternatives to school meals 
(which may differ between lunch and breakfast). 
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It is worth noting that price is not the only consideration. Indeed, school meals might be 
unappealing due to poor preparation, stringent nutritional standards, taste or the stigma associated with 
meal participation (Glantz, Berg, Porcari, Sackoff, & Pazer, 1994; Gleason, 1995; Mirtcheva & Powell, 
2009; Poppendieck, 2010). Instead, student participation reflects family resources and budget 
constraints, preferences over alternatives including brown bag lunch from home, purchased lunches from 
restaurants or stores outside school, vending machines in schools, and so on. Thus, school lunch 
participation may be un-responsive to price changes. Whether, and to what extent, UFM increases school 
meals participation is, in the end, an empirical question that we address in this paper.  
This study uses new, richly detailed data on individual, daily participation and the timing of price 
changes (adoption of UFM) to estimate the impact on student academic outcomes. Further, the richness 
of the data allows us to identify the impact of the policy change on participation, the effects on student 
outcomes, and heterogeneity in these effects across student subgroups. This is the first study to our 
knowledge that estimates the effects of school meals participation on academic achievement and obesity 
using direct, individual student measures of school meals participation. 
IV. UFM in NYC 
NYC provides a unique opportunity to study UFM. The largest school district in the country, NYC 
public schools enroll over 1.1 million students in more than 1500 public schools annually. This includes 
over 200,000 students in the middle school grades, 6-8, and more than 500 schools serving them. 
Critically to this study, more than 400 NYC public schools implemented UFM under Provision 2 and 
schools across the city operate under a set of common regulations and procedures – including 
standardized menus across the district -- reducing the potential for bias due to changes in the nutritional 
value of school meals, or other factors, concurrent with the adoption of UFM. While schools in NYC may 
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differ in their preferences for UFM, whether and when those preferences translate into adoption of UFM 
reflects the interplay of myriad of political, institutional and administrative factors, which makes the 
precise timing of UFM adoption by a particular school effectively random. Thus, our NYC setting offers 
the opportunity to gain insight into the efficacy of UFM and school lunch programs in practice, on a large 
scale and in a large urban school district. 
The precise number of NYC schools that offer UFM has varied year-to-year since 2009, but the 
number of schools offering UFM has not grown or declined steadily over time (Figure 2). About half of 
schools participate in a UFM program for at least one year from 2010-2013. UFM use expanded in the 
2010 and 2011 school years and contracted in 2012 and 2013.13 UFM schools may return to standard 
procedures for counting meals and meal reimbursement at any point; alternatively, UFM schools may 
request a 4-year extension of the program at the end of their UFM cycle as long as there are only 
“negligible” changes in the share of students with direct certification (US Department of Agriculture Food 
and Nutrition Service, 2002). While the number of schools offering UFM under Provision 2 varied over 
time, the eligibility criteria did not.14  
                                                                        
13 In part, this may be related to availability of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) funds. The 
number of UFM schools in NYC expands considerably again in the years following our sample period, including 
adoption in all NYC public schools for the 2017-2018 academic year. 
14 Moreover, we found no documentation related to implementation of Provision 2 of the National School Lunch 
Act (from the USDA, the NYC Department of Education Office of School Food, or otherwise) that suggest priority 
is given to applicant schools that serve more (or less) disadvantaged student populations, have better (or worse) 
history of academic performance, higher (or lower) school lunch and breakfast participation rates, or other selection 
criteria that might confound model estimates. Multiple meetings with the NYCDOE Office of School Food suggest 
that they also have not established informal criteria based on these sorts of considerations. We test these claims 
empirically by first testing extent to which the characteristics of the school’s student body in year t predict the future 
adoption of UFM in t+1 and by second examining the relationship between future UFM status in t+1 with current 
year student characteristics and outcomes in year t. Both sets of empirical results are consistent with the results of 
our review of the policy documentation and our meetings with those implementing the policy. 
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Why might some NYC schools adopt UFM and other not? According to the USDA “a school 
considering Provision 2 must evaluate whether the savings in administrative costs associated with 
reducing application burdens and simplifying meal counting and claiming procedures under Provision 2 
offset the costs of providing meals to all children at no charge” (US Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service, 2002).15 Thus, it is ultimately a choice made by school administrators in conjunction 
with the City school district and subject to Federal eligibility. 
In addition to schools offering UFM under Provision 2, NYC Department of Education 
(NYCDOE) has taken steps to increase access to school meals citywide, including price and menu changes 
(Perlman, Nonas, Lindstrom, Choe-Castillo, McKie, Alberti, 2012). In 2004, the NYCDOE implemented 
universal free breakfast – eliminating the 25-cent price for full price students and the 5-cent price for 
reduced price students (Leos-Urbel et al. 2013). A decade later, in September 2014, the NYC DOE 
extended UFM status to all freestanding middle schools. Figure 1 shows citywide prices for full and 
reduced price meals in the period 2002-2015. As shown, citywide prices for school meals in non-UFM 
schools are stable in the 2010-2013 period. We focus our study on this stable period in an effort to isolate 
the effect of UFM from other price effects.  
V. Data and Measures 
 Our analysis draws on a rich longitudinal student and school level data, for all NYC public 
elementary and middle school students and student-transaction-level data on meal participation for a 
                                                                        
15 Moreover, informal conversations with administrators and advocates suggest that school leaders are sometimes 
concerned that offering UFM could also increase risk of losing funding for other Federal and state aid programs that 
rely on measures of students individually eligible for free and reduced price meals. 
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large subset of students. Again, we focus on 2010-2013, to take advantage of data availability and the 
stability of meal prices in NYC.  
 Student data include sociodemographic characteristics such as gender, race/ethnicity, primary 
language spoken at home, English proficiency, birth country, and eligibility for free or reduced price lunch, 
participation in special education, attendance, and scores on ELA and math exams for grades 3–8, as well 
as student height and weight.16 Student-level data also includes measures of participation in school lunch 
and school breakfast for students attending a school collecting such data.17 Importantly, every student 
record includes a unique student identifier allowing us so to follow individual students over time. We 
exclude students in full time special education settings and those with less than two years of test score 
data to facilitate the estimation of the student fixed effects models, described in greater detail below.18 
Further, we restrict the sample to students with height and weight data, although we relax this constraint 
in robustness test described below. 
Test scores are transformed into z-scores using grade and year specific means and variances, 
zMath and zELA for the math and English language arts exams, respectively. Weight outcomes include 
Body Mass Index (BMI), measured as z-scores (normalized by grade and year), zBMI, or as a natural 
logarithm, ln(BMI), and indicator variables for overweight, obese and underweight, which we create using 
age- and sex-specific growth charts from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Finally, we 
                                                                        
16 Beginning in 2006, NYC public schools has collected annual measures of height, weight, and physical fitness of 
almost every student as part of the Fitnessgram initiative. By 2012–13, the Fitnessgram covered roughly 875,000 
students in 1,650 schools citywide. 
17 This new data is collected NYC Office of School Food (OSF) using an electronic Point of Service (POS) tracking 
system to record meal transactions with student ID and time stamps. 
18 The use of student fixed effects means that students with only a single observation will not contribute to the 
estimation, and the impact of UFM will be identified by the UFM Switchers. As a robustness check to our test score 
results, we re-estimate our models without excluding students missing weight data; results from these models are 
substantively unchanged and are available upon request of the authors. 
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construct a time invariant measure of poverty, Poor, that takes a value of 1 if a student is identified as 
eligible for free or reduced priced lunch in any year between 2001-2013 and 0 otherwise. We use this 
measure to capture poverty, rather than the annual, student-level measure of eligibility for free or reduce 
price lunch typically used in education research, because UFM reduces the incentives for families (and 
schools) to verify individual eligibility. Thus, the annual poverty measure may be correlated with UFM 
treatment.19 Nonpoor identifies students never observed as eligible for free or reduced price lunch during 
this period; that is, poor and non-poor are mutually exclusive.20 
 Annual school data include indicators for UFM status, enrollment, grades served, mean student 
characteristics, test scores and attendance rates, the number of breakfasts and lunches served, the number 
of students in each eligibility group, and total expenditures on school food. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for key variables, beginning with the sample of “All” general education middle school students 
(with two or more years of test scores and weight data) to provide context. As shown, NYC students are 
predominantly poor, with 90.0% eligible for free or reduced price lunch in at least one year between 2001 
and 2013, and predominantly “minority” - only 15% are White. Hispanics represent almost 40%, with 
28.5% Black and 17% Asian. Further, roughly one-sixth of all students are Foreign Born, more than half 
                                                                        
19 Though, students who do not submit lunch forms are still certified through “direct certification,” using matched 
NYC DOE student records and data indicating eligibility for SNAP, WIC, and other means-tested programs. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show that we observe similar poverty rates for the subset of students exposed to UFM 
in each sample year (Always UFM) and those exposed in some years but not others (UFM Switchers). 
20 It is important to note that non-poor students in NYC public schools are not typically well-to-do. Although many 
NYC residents are quite rich by national standards, many of the richest eschew public schooling for their children. 
Indeed, more than 15% of NYC school aged children attend independent schools, which include both parochial 
schools and private schools. Instead, many of the students we term non-poor are of modest means, with family 
income exceeding 185% of the Federal poverty line by small margins. Again, due to cost of living differences, a 
substantial portion of non-poor students living in high-cost places like NYC have real (regionally adjusted) incomes 
that would have qualified them as free lunch eligible in a lower-cost of living district. 
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speak a language other than English at home, and almost ten percent qualify as Limited English Proficient. 
Finally, 11.6 percent of these students qualify for part-time special education services. 
 We restrict our regression sample to students who attended a UFM school at some point between 
2010 and 2013. This “Ever UFM” sample includes 318,637 observations of 155,496 students in grades 
6-8.21 Ever UFM students are, unsurprisingly, different from All students, which includes students never 
attending a UFM school. As shown in Table 1, column 2, Ever UFM students are disproportionately Asian, 
Hispanic, Poor and foreign born, compared to All students. Among the Ever UFM, students exposed to 
UFM every year (Always UFM, column 3) and those exposed to UFM in some years but not others (UFM 
Switchers, column 4) are quite similar.22 Of the 201,004 observations on 100,194 UFM Switchers, 
71,971 are students who switch UFM status due to changing schools (ex. graduating from a school 
without UFM and entering a school with UFM).23 
A second sample includes only observations with lunch and breakfast participation data – limiting 
our sample to students attending one of the schools using an electronic Point of Service (POS) system to 
track meal transactions. Our “Ever UFM/POS” sample is, then, a subset of the Ever UFM sample and, for 
middle school grades includes 89,566 observations of 39,229 students in 153 middle schools.24 We 
measure school lunch participation (SLP) as the number of lunch transactions divided by the number of 
school days in the year. School breakfast participation (SBP) is defined similarly. As shown in Column 5 of 
                                                                        
21 Regression models also include students in grades 3-5. The “Ever UFM” sample for grades 3-8 has 659,797 
observations on 222,456 students attending 1,103 schools, 
22 Moreover, among Ever UFM students, differences between students currently exposed to UFM and those not 
currently exposed are not statistically significant. 
23 37,829 students switch UFM status due to changes in school UFM policy, of which 9,982 switch status at least 
twice (once by switching schools and once due to attending a school that switches status). 
24 The regression sample also includes 33,119 observations of 16,149 students in grades 3-5, including 80 
elementary schools (typically enrolling fewer than 100 Ever UFM/POS students) and 36 schools serving both 
elementary and middle grades.  
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Table 1, the mean School Lunch Participation rate (SLP) is about 62.2% in Ever UFM middle schools and 
the mean School Breakfast Participation rate (SBP) is roughly 11.3%.25  
VI. Empirical Strategy 
Baseline Model 
We exploit changes in student exposure to UFM over time in order to estimate the impact of UFM 
on academic achievement, school lunch participation and weight outcomes. To do so, we estimate a 
student fixed effects, difference-in-difference specification of a model linking student outcomes to UFM 
status and time varying student variables:  
(1) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = β0 + β1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + β2𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿’𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊β3 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where Yigst is a vector of variables reflecting outcomes for student i, in grade g, attending school s in year 
t, including test scores (zMath and zELA), attendance, and weight (zBMI, ln(BMI) and probability 
overweight, obese and underweight). UFM_Middleigst is the interaction between an indicator variable 
Middleigst (which takes a value of 1 if student i is in grades 6 through 8) and UFMst (which takes a value of 
1 if student i attends a UFM school in year t);26 UFM_Elemigst is the interaction between Elemigst (which 
takes a value of 1 if student i is in grades 3 through 5) and UFMst.27 Xigst is a vector of other student 
characteristics including those indicating LEP, and special education needs;28 γigst is a grade-by-year fixed 
                                                                        
25 We do not observe plate waste, etc. or any other direct measure of consumption. Future work examining the 
effect of UFM on consumption per se would be warranted. 
26 We omit Middleist because it is perfectly collinear with the grade-by-year fixed effect  
27 Again, regressions include students in elementary grades to increase precision of our middle school estimates, but 
regression results for UFM_Elem are suppressed. Elementary school regression results are largely insignificant, 
reflecting smaller sample size due to limited POS coverage in elementary schools. Results are available upon request 
from authors. 
28 As a robustness check, we substitute school fixed effects in for student fixed effects. In these alternative 
specifications, the vector Xist also includes variables indicating if a student is black, Hispanic, Asian, female, poor, 
foreign born, and does not speak English at home. 
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effect and δi is a student fixed effect. We cluster standard errors by school because UFM is a school level 
intervention and students are clustered in schools.29 Our coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the 
impact of UFM on student outcomes in middle school. Notice that equation (1) can also be viewed as the 
reduced-form equation in an instrumental variables model linking academic outcomes to participation in 
school lunch. 
Here, estimated coefficients will capture causal effects if the precise timing of the exposure of the 
student to UFM is conditionally random and, particularly, uncorrelated with unobserved concurrent 
changes in policies, practices and characteristics of the school.30 As noted earlier, institutional and 
practical considerations and exploratory empirical work suggest conditional randomness is both plausible 
and likely. We shows tests for the validity of the assumption empirically below. 
Heterogeneity by Student Poverty Status 
 We then explore heterogeneity in impacts by student poverty status, by estimating separate 
coefficients for poor and non-poor students. We do so by fully interacting model variables with Poor and 
Nonpoor, respectively.31 Again, we focus on the impacts for middle school students identified by within-
student changes in access to UFM over time. 
 Impact on School Meals Participation 
We then turn to impacts on SLP, which is the key mechanism for UFM impacts on academic 
outcomes. Importantly, breakfast is already free for all NYC students at the beginning of the study and, 
                                                                        
29 See, for example, Cameron and Miller (2015). 
30 Estimated impacts in student fixed effects models are identified by within student changes in UFM status. We 
note that within student variation in UFM status most often results from changing schools (70% of UFM Switchers 
change UFM status at the time of changing schools). 
31 In these models, we add interactions between poverty status (poor / non-poor) and grade level (middle / 
elementary), so that impacts are estimated within these subgroups. 
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thus, only lunch prices change after UFM.32 We use the same difference-in-differences strategy using the 
sample of POS students: 
(2) 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = β0 + β1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + β2𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 +
β3𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + β4𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿’𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊β5 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where SLPigst captures SLP for student i in grade g in school s in year t, and all other variables as defined 
previously. We estimate impacts on SLP (and SBP) by student poverty status and grade level, as described 
above. 
Notice that equation (2) can also be viewed as the first-stage model of two-stage least squares 
regression model linking academic outcomes to participation in school lunch. If UFM does, indeed, affect 
participation in school lunch, then it may be an effective instrumental variable for school lunch 
participation in subsequent models. 
  IV Models: The Effects of School Lunch Participation 
 We then estimate the effect of SLP on student outcomes, using UFM as an instrument to address 
potential endogeneity due, perhaps, to unobserved differences in income, motivation, or engagement 
between parents (or students) utilizing school lunch and those that do not or related to their reliance on 
lunch. Again, we estimate separate effects for poor and non-poor students:  
(3) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = β0 + β1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + β2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� +
β1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃� 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + β2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝑿𝑿’𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊β5 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
                                                                        
32 In addition to estimating impacts of UFM on lunch participation, we show the estimated effect of UFM on 
breakfast participation using the same model. Null results for SBP are necessary for the identifying assumptions of 
the IV model outlined below. 
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To be clear, we use the four variables created by fully interacting UFM with poverty status and grade level 
as instruments for SLP, again, fully interacted with poverty status and grade level.33 All other variables as 
defined previously. Thus, we estimate the effect of a one-percentage point increase in SLP on student 
outcomes. To give a better sense of magnitudes, we estimate the impact of increasing participation by 
about one lunch every 10 school days as 10*β1 and 10*β2, for the poor and non-poor respectively. We 
again cluster standard errors at the school level.34 
VIII. Results 
Impacts on Test Scores 
 Table 2 shows the impact estimates from our preferred model with student and grade-by-year 
fixed effects as well as controls for time-varying student characteristics. Columns 1-3 show results for the 
Ever UFM sample and columns 4-6 for the Ever UFM sample with POS (meal participation) data. As 
shown, among the EVER UFM students, UFM increases math and ELA scores for 6-8 grade students by 
0.036 and 0.030 standard deviations, respectively. We find no significant effects, however, on 
attendance rates. Coefficients estimated using the Ever UFM-POS sample (in columns 4-6), are 
somewhat larger in magnitude, although standard errors increase and only ELA results are statistically 
significant. Again, we find no effect on attendance. In sum, our core results indicate UFM significantly 
increases math and ELA test scores by between 0.030 and 0.043 standard deviations with no effect on 
attendance. 
                                                                        
33 Including the impact of UFM on SLP for poor middle, non-poor middle, poor elementary and non-poor elementary 
students. Again, elementary coefficients are suppressed but available upon request from the authors. 
34 In the IV fixed effects model, we cluster by the sequence of schools attended, instead of the school attended in 
each year, so that students switching schools are assigned to a single cluster representing the pair of schools 
attended and not two different clusters, one for each school attended. 
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Our next analyses, shown in Table 3, allow the impact of UFM to differ for poor and non-poor 
students. As before, models reported in columns 1-3 are estimated using the Ever UFM sample and 
columns 4-6 using the Ever UFM with POS sample and we only show the middle school results. UFM 
increases student performance for both poor and non-poor students in both ELA and math. The Ever UFM 
sample results for poor students are quite similar to the findings for the overall sample – coefficients on 
math and ELA are 0.032 and 0.027, respectively – but effects for non-poor students are more than 
double. UFM increases math and ELA scores by 0.083 and 0.059 standard deviations respectively. 
Furthermore, the differences in impacts between poor and non-poor students are significantly different. 
Again, restricting the sample to students with meal participation (POS) data yield substantively 
similar results. Point estimates for the poor are a bit larger (0.048 and 0.042 for math and ELA, 
respectively), for the non-poor a bit smaller (0.061 and 0.055), and standard errors larger, leaving only 
the ELA coefficient for the poor statistically significant at conventional levels. As a result, we are unable 
to reject the hypothesis that impacts are same for the poor and non-poor in this sample. 
Here, attendance results are a bit more mixed. In the Ever UFM models, estimates indicate a small 
negative effect on attendance, a statistically significant 0.124 percentage point decrease (1/5 of a school 
day annually, on average) among non-poor students. Results for the more limited sample, however, are 
insignificant and becomes positive for the poor. None of the coefficients are large enough to be considered 
as substantively meaningful effects on attendance. 
Taken together, Table 3 provides evidence of positive effects of UFM on academic performance 
for both groups, with larger effects for the non-poor (0.05 to 0.08 standard deviations) -- for whom UFM 
changed the price of lunch – than the poor (0.03 to 0.05 standard deviations). Alternatively, there is little 
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evidence of a substantively meaningful effect on attendance for either group, and only one coefficient 
reaches the size of statistical significance using conventional levels. 
 These are substantively meaningful improvements in test scores – on average, roughly 10% to 
12% of the black-white test score gap in this sample, with even bigger effects for non-poor students. Our 
results for non-poor students are similar in magnitude to studies of related interventions. Imberman and 
Kugler (2014) find that providing free breakfast in class rather than in the cafeteria raises math and 
reading test scores by 0.09 and 0.06 standard deviations, respectively. Similarly, Frisvold (2015) finds 
that universal free breakfast increases math and reading test scores by 0.08 and 0.05 standard deviations, 
respectively. Further, in the education policy literature, a common rule of thumb is that a 0.1 standard 
deviation improvement in test scores in one subject is small, but indicative of a successful intervention 
(Bloom et al., 2006). Our UFM effect on test scores is nearly that large, particularly for non-poor students. 
Moreover, UFM improves performance in two subjects – math and ELA – rather than one, which is typical 
for targeted educational interventions. 
Finally, to give a sense of the potential magnitude of the effects, we draw on Hill et al. (2008) to 
translate our effect sizes into a 'weeks of learning’ metric. To be clear, these "back of the envelope" 
estimates are best viewed as crude and their accuracy depends upon whether, and to what extent, the 
properties of the NYC context (e.g., tests) match those of the national context of the Hill study.35 That 
said, applying the Hill et al. parameters to our estimated coefficients suggests UFM would improve 
                                                                        
35 Assumptions include: (1) mean academic growth for middle school students in NYC is the same as the national 
average, (2) a standard deviation in test scores for two pooled grades and nationally normed as in Hill et al. (2008) 
reflects the same variation in achievement as a standard deviation in test scores normed within one grade in NYC, 
(3) test scores reflect learning during the 36 weeks of the school year not differential learning loss over the summer. 
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performance in math by as much as 7-10 weeks of learning and by as much as 6-9 weeks of learning in ELA 
for non-poor students.  For poor students, effects are roughly 3-4 weeks of learning in math and ELA.36 
Impact on School Meals Participation 
 Table 4 presents the results of the models estimating the impact of UFM on SLP. These are, 
perforce, estimated using the sample of students with POS data only. As shown in column 1, we estimate 
attending a UFM school increases school lunch participation for both poor (5.395 percentage points) and 
non-poor students (10.974), relatively large compared to their lunch participation rate of 63.96 and 
45.55, respectively.  
Column 2 shows our estimates of the impact of UFM on school breakfast participation, 
investigating the possibility of a substitution effect. We find no effect of UFM on SBP. Coefficients are 
negative but small compared to the standard error and not approaching significance at conventional levels.  
IV Results: The Effects of School Lunch Participation 
 As shown in Column 1 of Table 4, our SLP models suggest UFM is a strong instrument for SLP; 
UFM status by grade level and poverty is highly predictive of SLP. 37 Table 5 shows our IV estimates of 
the impact of SLP on academic outcomes. To review, these models use UFM as an instrument for SLP, 
allowing us to estimate a causal effect of increasing participation in school lunch itself. The results indicate 
                                                                        
36 Mechanically, we divide the point estimates of the impact of UFM presented in Table 3 by the mean annual gain 
in effect sizes presented in Hill et al. (2008) between the springs of grades 5 and 6, between 6 and 7, and between 
7 and 8 (mean annual effect size gains for math are 0.41, 0.30, and 0.32, respectively, and for reading/ELA are 
0.32, 0.23, and 0.26, respectively). We then multiply the quotient by the number of school weeks an academic 
year, 36. We present the range of results across the three middle school grades rounded to the nearest week. 
37 Specifically, we use four instruments (UFM_Middle*Poor, UFM_Middle*Nonpoor, UFM_Elem*Poor, 
UFM_Elem*Nonpoor) to address potential endogeneity of four regressors (SLP_Middle*Poor, 
SLP_Middle*Nonpoor, SLP_Elem*Poor, SLP_Elem*Nonpoor). F-tests of the first stage regressions are as follows: 
44.50, 22.36, 16.06 and 22.97, respectively. 
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participation in school lunch increases performance on both ELA and math, for both poor and non-poor 
middle school students. More specifically, a one percentage-point increase in SLP increases math scores 
by 0.008 standard deviations for poor students and 0.006 for the non-poor. ELA results are similar at 
0.007 and 0.006 for poor and non-poor, respectively. To give a sense of the magnitudes, these suggest 
math scores will rise by 8% of a standard deviation if school lunch participation increases by one lunch 
every two weeks (about a 10 percentage-point increase) for poor students and by 6% of a standard 
deviation for non-poor students. (For ELA, these will be 7% and 6%, respectively.) Thus, while UFM has 
a larger effect for non-poor than poor students, the IV estimates suggest that increasing SLP improves test 
scores for both types of students at about the same rate (and, perhaps, at a greater rate for poor 
students).38 Finally, we find no effect of SLP on attendance, as before. 
Unintended Consequences for Student Weight Outcomes 
 Lastly, we explore possible unintended consequences for student weight outcomes. Reduced 
form estimates of the impact of UFM on student BMI and other weight outcomes, shown in Table 6, 
provide no evidence of deleterious effects on weight outcomes for poor or non-poor students in middle 
school. Out of five models estimating impacts on BMI, measured both as a z-score and with the natural 
logarithm, overweight, obese or underweight, nine of ten estimated coefficients have negative signs, but 
only one – a 2.5 percentage point decrease in the probability obese for non-poor students – is statistically 
significant. While other results are insignificant, point estimates for non-poor are larger than the poor. For 
example, coefficients in the BMI model presented in column 1 show 0.040 versus 0.003 standard 
                                                                        
38 To be clear, while the point estimates are different for the poor and non-poor, the statistical significance of the 
differences between these varies. Confidence intervals overlap in some cases. Future work will investigate the 
sensitivity of these differences and their statistical significance. 
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deviation reductions (and column 2 show 0.010 percent vs. 0.000 percent reductions) for non-poor 
versus poor students, respectively.  
Estimates from the IV models (shown in Table 7) are, again, largely negative and and insignificant.  
Only one coefficient is statistically significant (column 4): a one percentage point increase in SLP 
decreases the probability that a non-poor student is obese by 0.1 percentage point. This is a substantively 
meaningful; one additional school lunch every two school-weeks decreases probability that non-poor 
students are obese by one percentage point. As with reduced form estimates, point estimates are larger 
for the non-poor, but coefficients are insignificant.39 
That said, a majority of height and weight assessments occur in the fall, meaning we capture very 
short run effects here. More important, perhaps, is that the SLP measure used above captures 
participation over the entire academic year, much of which will be after the Fitnessgram assessment, 
suggesting measurement error and potential attenuation bias.40 To address this we use the daily meal 
participation data and student-specific Fitnessgram dates (month/year) to construct a measure of SLP in 
the month(s) prior to the Fitnessgram assessment. As an example, our “pre-Fitnessgram SLP” will capture 
September and October participation for students with November height and weight measurements.41 
                                                                        
39 Results from school fixed effects models, which serve as a robustness check and are shown in Table A2 of the 
Appendix, also suggest that there is no effect of UFM on student weight outcomes. Tables A3 and A4 of the 
Appendix show that the first and second stage estimates from the two-stage least squares IV models with school 
FE are similar in magnitude as those shown in Tables 4, 5 and 7. Again, however, coefficients are more precisely 
estimate in models with student FE. 
40 Unlike ELA and Math exams, which occur toward the end of the spring semester. 
41 By construction, observations of students whom have Fitnessgram assessments in September (28,793 
observations) are excluded from this analysis since there are no academic months before September. In additional 
sensitivity analyses, we include both the months prior to and including the month of Fitnessgram assessment in 
construction of the “pre-Fitnessgram SLP” variable. Thus, for this example, we measure SLP using September, 
October and November participation for students who have their heights and weights measured in November. In 
these sensitivity analyses observations with September Fitnessgram assessments are included. Results are 
consistent with those shown here and are available upon request. 
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Estimates from models with this more accurate measurement of pre-Fitnessgram SLP, shown in 
Table 8, suggest participation in school lunch improves weight outcomes for middle school students, 
particularly the non-poor. Coefficients are larger in magnitude and more precisely estimated than those 
estimated using annual SLP in Table 7 (consistent with reducing measurement error). Specifically, we find 
that a one percentage point increase in SLP reduces BMI by 0.1 percent (column 2) and the probability 
obese by 0.2 percentage points (column 4) for the non-poor. As before, estimates suggest SLP decreases 
student weight, as well, though the differences between the poor and non-poor are smaller in these 
preferred estimates. Thus, these results suggest SLP does not have deleterious effects on middle school 
student weight outcomes and may, instead, improve weight outcomes. 
 Our results differ markedly from Schanzenbach (2009), which finds poor students participating 
in school lunch are more likely to be obese. There are many possible explanations for the difference. We 
note three here. First, we study middle school students while Schanzenbach (2009) focuses on early 
elementary grades. Differences in our findings may reflect differences in metabolic processes for these 
ages or, perhaps more convincingly, differences in reliance on school lunch vs. alternatives (brown bag or 
fast food) between middle and elementary school students. Second, the quality of NYC school meals may 
have been better than the average school in the ECLS-K data used by Schanzenbach. (NYCDOE suggests 
that they made substantial efforts to improve school lunch menu quality.) Third, the NYC “food 
environment” outside the school may be less healthy, that is, differences in access to and types of 
restaurant food alternatives or differences in out-lunch policies. We leave the exploration of these 
possibilities for future work. 
To summarize, we find UFM induces a large increase in meal take up rate (measured as SLP); that 
SLP increases both for poor students who would otherwise be eligible for meal subsidies and for non-poor 
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students who would be ineligible in the absence of UFM; that UFM improves academic achievement, but 
has no significant effects on attendance; UFM and SLP have smaller effects on BMI and obesity, and that 
evidence there suggests somewhat improved weight outcomes. All of these findings mirror the results of 
the pilot UFSM program evaluation in the United Kingdom (Kitchen et al., 2013). 
VIII. Probing the Results 
Robustness Checks  
 We explore the robustness of our results first by estimating models using school fixed effects, µs, 
instead of student fixed effects, γigst. While student fixed effects models (above) are identified by the 
variation in UFM exposure within student over time – due both to students switching into/out of schools 
with UFM and schools adopting/removing UFM – school fixed effects models rely on the changes in school 
UFM status only. Again, standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
 Results from school fixed effects models are shown in Table A1 through Table A4 of the 
Appendix. Results are consistent with those derived from student fixed effects models, though 
coefficients are generally less precisely estimated. Similar point estimates in student and school fixed 
effects models offer credibility that both identification strategies produce unbiased estimates of the 
impact of UFM. 
We test the robustness of the test score models to expanding the student sample to include those 
students previously excluded because of missing height and weight data. The new sample includes Ever 
UFM students with at least two years of test score data, even if they have missing height or weight data. 
Test score results are robust to this more inclusive sample. Results are similar in direction, magnitude and 
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statistical significance for both Ever UFM and Ever UFM/POS students. These results are available up 
request of the authors. 
 In addition, we explore potential heterogeneity of results for weight outcomes by gender and do 
not find substantively different results for boys and girls. Mirroring results in Tables 6 and 7, coefficients 
are substantively small and do not provide any evidence of deleterious effects on weight. Again, results 
are available upon request of the authors. 
Do Observables Predict UFM? 
A key condition underlying a causal interpretation of our estimates is that the timing of the 
adoption of UFM is conditionally random. We explore the plausibility of this assumption by examining the 
extent to which the characteristics of the school’s student body in year t predict the adoption of UFM in 
t+1. To be specific, using school level data for 2006-2013, we estimate a model linking student 
characteristics in t to UFM status in the following year.42 We restrict the sample to Ever UFM schools for 
which UFMst=0 in time t (that is, schools not offering UFM in t) and estimate: 
(4) 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = β0 + 𝑿𝑿’𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊β1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where all variables are school level aggregates of student variables previously defined.43 The coefficients, 
β1, capture the extent to which student characteristics predict UFM status in the following year, and 
provide suggestive evidence on the plausibility of the assumption that UFM adoption is exogenous 
                                                                        
42 We also conduct this analysis focusing on just the 2010-2013 sample period, also finding statistically 
insignificant results, but with much larger standard errors due to the limited sample size for school level analyses. 
We find the null results from the longer panel even more convincing due to the imprecision of the estimates from 
school level models using the shorter panel period. Results from the short panel are available upon request. 
43 We aggregate variables as follows: SLP and SBP are mean school-level participation rates; obese, overweight, 
underweight, female, Asian, Hispanic, Black, immigrant, LEP, SPED are shares of students with each characteristics, 
and Math – 3, Math – 4, ELA – 3, and ELA – 4 are shares of students with achievement levels 3 or 4 on the statewide 
math and ELA exams, respectively.  
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(conditionally random) at the school level. Here, significant coefficients would suggest selection bias (or 
endogeneity problems); insignificant coefficients suggest a causal interpretation may be warranted. 
 We show school level results in column 1 of Appendix table Table A5. We find little evidence that 
school characteristics in t predict UFM adoption in t+1, providing support for the hypothesis that the 
precise timing of UFM adoption can be treated as exogenous to the school and bolstering the case for a 
causal interpretation of the results..44 
We perform a similar exercise to assess the endogeneity of the phase out of UFM. Here we re-
estimate model (4) restricting the sample to Ever UFM schools that do offer UFM in t, that is, (UFMt=1). 
In this way, the model sheds light on the extent to which student characteristics in t predict UFM phase-
out in the following year (t+1). As shown in column 2 of Table A5, the results suggest student 
characteristics do not, in fact, predict UFM phase out, providing support for the view that the phase out is 
exogenous to the school and bolstering, again, the case for a causal interpretation of the results Taken 
together, these analyses show neither adoption nor phase out of UFM is predicted by observables, 
boosting confidence in the causal interpretation of our impact estimates.45 
Falsification Tests 
In a set of falsification tests, we examine the sensitivity of our results to substituting future UFM 
status for current UFM status to test whether our estimates reflect changes in outcomes that predate 
UFM and precipitating the adoption of UFM, rather than the impact of the policy itself. In particular, we 
examine the relationship between future UFM status (UFMist+1) and twelve student outcomes (test 
                                                                        
44 Not a single coefficient among the model’s 16 variables is statistically significant at the 10% level. 
45 Across the two models with 16 coefficients each (32 coefficients in all), only three coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 10% level, which is what one would expect from random chance alone. 
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scores, attendance, weight, SLP, SBP etc.) in year t. First, we use the full sample of Ever UFM POS 
students. Second we use only the subset of students without UFM in t (that is, UFMist=0). The intuition is 
straightforward. If the link between UFM and student outcomes is causal, future UFM should have no 
impact on current outcomes and coefficients will be insignificant. In contrast, significant coefficients on 
UFM in these models would suggest our impact estimates might be biased by selection into or out of UFM. 
Results are shown in Appendix Table A6; Panel A shows results for the full sample and Panel B for 
the UFM=0 subset. The results are encouraging. None of the twenty-four estimated coefficients on 
UFMist+1 is statistically significant. That is, there is no evidence that future UFM predicts current 
outcomes, bolstering confidence in the causal interpretation of our results.  
Finally, we estimate ten of the twelve falsification models for the set of all Ever UFM students – 
relaxing the requirement that the student has POS data. Since some of these students will not have SLP 
and SBP data, we only estimate the other models. Again, all coefficients on future UFM are insignificant.46  
XI. Conclusions 
Advocates argue UFM will deliver a variety of benefits: reduce stigma that limits participation, 
reduce food insecurity for needy students, improve student readiness to learn and reduce administrative 
burden. Critics are skeptical, charging UFM may increase obesity and increase costs for schools. The 
dearth of evidence hampers decision-making. NYC DOE, for example, after much debate, extended UFM 
to all public school students and would benefit from better understanding of the consequences such a 
policy is likely to have on students’ academic achievement and weight. This paper begins to fill that gap, 
providing credibly causal estimates of the impacts of UFM on student academic and weight outcomes. 
                                                                        
46 These results are available upon request of the authors. 
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Moreover, our unique data allow us to exploit adoption of UFM to contribute new credibly causal 
evidence on the effect of school lunch on student outcomes. In particular, we use longitudinal, student-
level data on participation in school breakfast and lunch for a large sample of students to investigate the 
effect of UFM on SLP and, subsequently, the impact of SLP on student outcomes. This work informs the 
national debate over the benefits of school meals programs. 
Our findings point to a positive effect of UFM on the test scores of middle school students – both 
poor and non-poor – with the largest increases for non-poor students. We find UFM increases 
participation in school lunch and the increases in participation induced by UFM improve student 
performance on both ELA and math exams -- again, for both poor and non-poor. 
Findings for the non-poor suggest price matters for this group of students whose families have 
household income exceeding 185% of the Federal poverty line. Findings for the poor – who would 
experience no direct change in price -- suggest that stigma plays a role in participation decisions as well. 
As for unintended consequences, we see no evidence that the reduction in the price of school lunch lead 
to a decrease in participation in school breakfast due, perhaps, to a substitution effect. (Breakfast was 
already free in NYC public schools.)  
Finally, we find no evidence that UFM or school lunch participation itself increases student weight, 
or the incidence of obesity, overweight or even underweight. Instead, the preponderance of negative, but 
largely insignificant, coefficients in obesity, overweight and BMI models suggest possible improvements 
in obesity and weight outcomes due to UFM and SLP. Indeed, our preferred IV models, which focus on the 
impact of SLP prior to assessment of weight and height, suggest SLP may reduce obesity and BMI. Further 
research is needed to identify the contexts and conditions under which UFM and school meals affect 
student health, and to explore heterogeneity across socio-economically and demographically different 
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students. We are particularly interested in heterogeneity of impacts across subgroups defined by 
race/ethnicity, immigrant status, and urbanicity and food environment around the school. It is possible, for 
example, that the impact depends upon the alternatives to school meals, which may, in turn, depend upon 
the school food environment, availability of fast food, or family resources. In another vein, impacts may 
depend upon school food policies such as open campus or “out-lunch” policies, or the characteristics of 
cafeterias and/or menus. We plan to return to these questions in future research, exploiting additional 
years of data as UFM expands, and collecting new data on the neighborhood food environment, school 
food policies, etc.  
 We note that our paper focuses on the impacts of UFM policies adopted under Provision 2. These 
UFM policies affect the prices paid by students the same as district-wide UFM policies. That said, it is 
plausible that a district-wide UFM policy may have a different effect than the school-wide UFM policies 
offered under Provision 2. Again, this is worthy of additional research. 
We can also compare the assessed benefits of UFM to the costs of providing free meals to all 
students. In a 2017 policy brief, the NYC Independent Budget Office (IBO) suggests that expanding UFM 
to all NYC elementary school students under the CEP would increase school lunch costs by $13.5 million 
if there were no effect on SLP. It would cost an additional $5 million if UFM increased SLP by 10% (about 
the magnitude of the effect on SLP shown in this paper). For a school system the size of NYC (over 1 
million children each year, over 400,000 of which are in elementary grades), this is a trivial increase in per 
pupil costs: less than $50 per pupil. Taken on its face, this is a small price to pay for up to a half a standard 
deviation increase in both math and ELA test scores. Thus, UFM appears to be an inexpensive and 
effective way to encourage middle school students’ participation in school meals and improve academic 
achievement without deleterious effects on obesity. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. New York City Public School Meal Prices by Year, 2001-2015 
Notes: Prices in NYC Public Schools for breakfast (BK) and lunch, academic years 2001-2015. Meals 
provided free of charge for students at or below 135% of the Federal poverty line, at a reduced price for 
those at or below 185% of the Federal poverty line and at full price for all other students. In AY 2015, 
UFM extended to all freestanding middle schools (6-8 and 5-8 schools only). Point of Service (POS) data 
is available for a subset of schools in academic years 2010-2013, which is our study period. Breakfast is 
free for all students in our study period; UFM only affects lunch prices during this period. 
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Figure 2. Number of UFM Schools by Year, 2009-2013 
 
Notes: UFM schools provide free meals to all students, regardless of individual student eligibility. Elem 
indicates that a school serves 4th graders, Middle indicates that it serves 7th graders, and Elem-Middle 
indicates that a school serves both 4th and 7th graders. All Elem and Middle Schools reflects the sum of all 
UFM and non-UFM Elementary, Middle, and Elementary-Middle schools.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, Middle School Students ONLY, by UFM and POS status, 
2010-2013 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
All 
Ever 
UFM 
Always 
UFM 
UFM 
Switchers 
Ever 
UFM/POS 
Percentage:  Female 50.3 50.5 50.1 50.7 50.0 
White 15.0 12.1 10.9 12.7 13.7 
Asian 17.4 19.5 18.0 20.3 19.7 
Black 28.1 25.8 25.3 26.1 26.5 
Hispanic 39.5 42.6 45.6 40.8 40.1 
Poor 90.0 92.4 91.9 92.7 90.7 
Foreign Born 16.5 17.5 19.5 16.4 17.7 
No English at Home 57.0 52.1 50.5 53.1 54.7 
LEP 9.6 10.0 11.2 9.3 8.8 
Special Ed. 11.6 11.2 11.2 11.2 10.3 
Mean SLP N/A N/A N/A N/A 62.2 
SBP N/A N/A N/A N/A 11.3 
N 645,204 318,637 117,633 201,004 89,566 
Notes: Sample includes observations of 6th-8th grade students with at least two years of test scores and 
weight outcome data. Ever UFM students are either Always UFM or UFM Switchers. 
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Table 2. Estimated Impacts of UFM on Academic Outcomes, 2010-2013 
 
 Ever UFM Ever UFM/POS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES zmath zELA Attd_rate zmath zELA Attd_rate 
UFM Middle 0.036*** 0.030*** -0.038 0.049 0.043** 0.127 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.070) (0.031) (0.018) (0.165) 
       
Student Char. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Constant 0.499*** 0.286*** 93.138*** 1.018*** 0.758*** 92.731*** 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.141) (0.078) (0.073) (0.486) 
       
Observations 659,797 659,797 659,797 122,685 122,685 122,685 
Students 222,456 222,456 222,456 47,887 47,887 47,887 
Schools 1,103 1,103 1,103 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.837 0.806 0.812 0.866 0.832 0.828 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Columns 
1 through 3 include students who attend a UFM school at least one year from 2010-2013. Columns 4 
through 6 include a subset of Ever UFM students with POS data. Samples include observations of 3rd-
8th grade students with at least two years of test scores and weight outcome data. Results for students in 
grades 3-5 suppressed. All models control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for 
limited English proficiency and special education services, student fixed effects, and grade-by-year fixed 
effects.  
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Table 3. Estimated Impacts of UFM on Academic Outcomes by Poverty, 2010-2013 
 Ever UFM Ever UFM/POS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES zmath zELA Attd Rate zmath zELA Attd Rate 
UFM Middle       
Poor 0.032** 0.027** -0.029 0.048 0.042** 0.153 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.073) (0.029) (0.018) (0.173) 
Non-Poor 0.083*** 0.059*** -0.124* 0.061 0.055 -0.067 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.071) (0.063) (0.041) (0.166) 
       
Student Char. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Constant -1.991*** -1.109*** 101.654*** -1.532*** -1.061*** 99.476*** 
 (0.075) (0.056) (0.682) (0.160) (0.127) (1.064) 
       
Observations 659,797 659,797 659,797 122,685 122,685 122,685 
Students 222,456 222,456 222,456 47,887 47,887 47,887 
Schools 1,103 1,103 1,103 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.837 0.806 0.812 0.866 0.832 0.829 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Columns 
1 through 3 include students who attend a UFM school at least one year from 2010-2013. Columns 4 
through 6 include a subset of Ever UFM students with POS data. Sample includes observations of 3rd-
8th grade students with at least two years of test scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for 
students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models control for a vector of student characteristics including 
indicators for limited English proficiency and special education services, student fixed effects, grade-by-
year fixed effects, and interactions between student grade level and poverty status.   
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Table 4. Estimated Impacts of UFM on School Meal Participation by Poverty, 2010-
2013 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SLP SBP 
UFM Middle   
Poor 5.395*** -1.956 
 (1.389) (1.566) 
Non-Poor 10.975** -1.104 
 (4.389) (3.196) 
   
Student Char. Y Y 
Student FE Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y 
   
Constant 73.454*** 18.851*** 
 (3.447) (3.457) 
   
Observations 122,685 122,685 
Students 47,887 47,887 
Schools 233 233 
R-squared 0.826 0.744 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample 
includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least two years of test 
scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models 
control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for limited English proficiency and 
special education services, student fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between 
student grade level and poverty status. 
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Table 5.  Estimated Impacts of SLP on Academic Outcomes by Poverty, IV Model, 2010-
2013 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES zmath zELA Attd_rate 
SLP Middle    
Poor 0.008** 0.007*** 0.026 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.019) 
    
Non-Poor 0.006** 0.006*** 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) 
    
Student Char. Y Y Y 
Student FE Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y 
    
Observations 121,402 121,402 121,402 
Students 46,604 46,604 46,604 
Clusters 2,465 2,465 2,465 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by sequence of schools attended (*p < .10. **p<.05. 
***p<.01). Sample includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least 
two years of test scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. 
All models control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for limited English proficiency 
and special education services, student fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between 
student grade level and poverty status. We instrument for student SLP using UFM status, differentiating 
between student grade level and poverty status. We use four instruments (UFM-Poor-Middle, UFM-Non-
Poor-Middle, UFM-Poor-Elementary and UFM-Non-Poor-Elementary) to address endogeneity of four 
regressors (SLP-Poor-Middle, SLP-Non-Poor-Middle, SLP-Poor-Elementary and SLP-Non-Poor-
Elementary, respectively). F-tests of the first stage regressions are as follows: 44.50, 22.36, 16.06 and 
22.97, respectively. 1,283 singletons are dropped from this analysis.   
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Table 6. Estimated Impacts of UFM on Weight Outcomes by Poverty, 2010-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES zBMI ln(BMI) Overwgt Obese Undrwgt 
UFM Middle      
Poor -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) 
Non-Poor -0.040 -0.010 -0.004 -0.025*** 0.009 
 (0.031) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
      
Student Char. Y Y Y Y Y 
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
      
Constant 0.010 3.012*** 0.480*** 0.211*** 0.002 
 (0.095) (0.021) (0.052) (0.039) (0.021) 
      
Observations 122,685 122,685 122,685 122,685 122,685 
Students 47,887 47,887 47,887 47,887 47,887 
Schools 233 233 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.904 0.904 0.820 0.819 0.639 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample 
includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least two years of test 
scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models 
control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for limited English proficiency and 
special education services, student fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between 
student grade level and poverty status.  
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Table 7. Estimated Impacts of SLP on Weight Outcomes by Poverty, IV Model, 2010-
2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES zBMI ln(BMI) Overwgt Obese Undrwgt 
SLP Middle      
Poor -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
      
Non-Poor -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
      
Student Char. Y Y Y Y Y 
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
      
Observations 121,402 121,402 121,402 121,402 121,402 
Students 46,604 46,604 46,604 46,604 46,604 
Clusters 2,465 2,465 2,465 2,465 2,465 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by sequence of schools attended (*p < .10. **p<.05. 
***p<.01). Sample includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least 
two years of test scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. 
All models control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for limited English proficiency 
and special education services, student fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between 
student grade level and poverty status. We instrument for student SLP using UFM status, differentiating 
between student grade level and poverty status. We use four instruments (UFM-Poor-Middle, UFM-Non-
Poor-Middle, UFM-Poor-Elementary and UFM-Non-Poor-Elementary) to address endogeneity of four 
regressors (SLP-Poor-Middle, SLP-Non-Poor-Middle, SLP-Poor-Elementary and SLP-Non-Poor-
Elementary, respectively). F-tests of the first stage regressions are as follows: 44.50, 22.36, 16.06 and 
22.97, respectively. 1,283 singletons are dropped from this analysis. 
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Table 8. Estimated Impacts of SLP before Fitnessgram on Weight Outcomes, IV Model, 
2010-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES zBMI ln(BMI) Overwgt Obese Undrwgt 
SLP-Middle      
Poor -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
      
Non-Poor -0.005 -0.001* -0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Student Char. Y Y Y Y Y 
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
      
Observations 86,257 86,257 86,257 86,257 86,257 
Students 34,616 34,616 34,616 34,616 34,616 
School Paths 2,047 2,047 2,047 2,047 2,047 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by sequence of schools attended (*p<.10. 
**p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data, 
Fitnessgram dates after September, and at least two years of test scores and weight data from 2010-
2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models control for a vector of student 
characteristics including indicators for limited English proficiency and special education services, student 
fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between student grade level and poverty 
status. We instrument for student SLP using UFM status, differentiating between student grade level and 
poverty status. We use four instruments (UFM-Poor-Middle, UFM-Non-Poor-Middle, UFM-Poor-
Elementary and UFM-Non-Poor-Elementary) to address endogeneity of four regressors (SLP-Poor-
Middle, SLP-Non-Poor-Middle, SLP-Poor-Elementary and SLP-Non-Poor-Elementary, respectively). F-
tests of the first stage regressions are as follows: 30.36, 15.56, 9.90 and 20.89, respectively. 7,619 
singletons are dropped from this analysis. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Robustness Check, School FE Models, Estimated Impacts of UFM on Academic Outcomes, 
2010-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES zmath zELA Attd_rate zmath zELA Attd_rate 
UFM Middle 0.046 0.029* -0.007    
 (0.033) (0.016) (0.150)    
UFM Middle, Poor    0.045 0.031* 0.000 
    (0.032) (0.017) (0.156) 
UFM Middle, Non-Poor    0.047 0.011 -0.037 
    (0.053) (0.035) (0.177) 
       
Student Char. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
School FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Constant 0.496*** 0.457*** 95.409*** -0.610*** -0.575*** 87.589*** 
 (0.058) (0.052) (0.214) (0.065) (0.068) (0.873) 
       
Observations 122,685 122,685 122,685 122,685 122,685 122,685 
Students 47,887 47,887 47,887 47,887 47,887 47,887 
Schools 233 233 233 233 233 233 
R-squared 0.343 0.327 0.124 0.344 0.327 0.124 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample 
includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least two years of test 
scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models 
control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for student gender, race/ethnicity, 
birth outside the U.S., poverty status, and participation in limited English proficiency and special 
education programs, school fixed effects, and grade-by-year fixed effects. 
 
 
Table A2. Robustness Check, School FE Models, Estimated Impacts of UFM on Weight 
Outcomes by Poverty, 2010-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES zBMI ln(BMI) Overwgt Obese Undrwgt 
UFM Middle      
Poor 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
Non-Poor -0.014 -0.002 -0.007 -0.011 0.005 
 (0.029) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) 
      
Student Char. Y Y Y Y Y 
School FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
      
Constant -0.011 3.067*** 0.413*** 0.243*** 0.028*** 
 (0.075) (0.015) (0.037) (0.031) (0.008) 
      
Observations 122,685 122,685 122,685 122,685 122,685 
Students 47,887 47,887 47,887 47,887 47,887 
Schools 226 226 226 226 226 
R-squared 0.048 0.103 0.035 0.035 0.017 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample 
includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least two years of test 
scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models 
control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for student gender, race/ethnicity, 
birth outside the U.S., poverty, and participation in limited English proficiency and special education 
programs, school fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between student grade level 
and poverty status. 
  
45 
 
Table A3. Robustness Check, School FE Models, Estimated Impacts of UFM on School 
Meal Participation by Poverty, 2010-2013 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES SLP SBP 
UFM Middle   
Poor 6.334*** -2.073* 
 (1.185) (1.178) 
Non-Poor 15.908*** 1.302 
 (3.364) (2.309) 
   
Student Char. Y Y 
School FE Y Y 
Grade*Year FE Y Y 
   
Constant 47.696*** 5.954** 
 (2.676) (2.608) 
   
Observations 122,685 122,685 
Students 47,887 47,887 
Schools 233 233 
R-squared 0.374 0.225 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample 
includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least two years of test 
scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models 
control for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for student gender, race/ethnicity, 
birth outside the U.S., poverty, and participation in limited English proficiency and special education 
programs, school fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between student grade level 
and poverty status. 
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Table A4.  Robustness Check, IV School FE Models, Estimated Impacts of SLP on 
Student Outcomes by Poverty, 2010-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES zmath zELA Attd_rate zBMI ln(BMI) Overwgt Obese Undrwgt 
SLP Middle         
Poor 0.006 0.005* 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Non-Poor 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
         
Student 
Char. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
School FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Grade*Year 
FE 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 122,678 122,678 122,678 122,678 122,678 122,678 122,678 122,678 
Students 47,880 47,880 47,880 47,880 47,880 47,880 47,880 47,880 
Schools 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample 
includes observations of Ever UFM students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least two years of test 
scores and weight data from 2010-2013. Results for students in grades 3-5 suppressed. All models control 
for a vector of student characteristics including indicators for student gender, race/ethnicity, birth outside 
the U.S., poverty, and participation in limited English proficiency and special education programs, school 
fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, and interactions between student grade level and poverty status. 
We instrument for student SLP using UFM status, differentiating between student grade level and poverty 
status. We use four instruments (UFM-Poor-Middle, UFM-Non-Poor-Middle, UFM-Poor-Elementary and 
UFM-Non-Poor-Elementary) to address endogeneity of four regressors (SLP-Poor-Middle, SLP-Non-
Poor-Middle, SLP-Poor-Elementary and SLP-Non-Poor-Elementary, respectively). F-tests pf the first 
stage regressions are as follows: 14.43, 14.10, 11.10 and 12.95, respectively. 7 singletons are dropped 
from this analysis.  
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Table A5. Regression Results, UFM Adoption and Phase out Models, AY 2006-2013 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES UFM Adoption UFM Removal 
Share:   
SLP 0.003 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
SBP 0.000 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Obese -1.020 1.435 
 (0.893) (1.097) 
Overweight 0.877 -1.223 
 (0.709) (0.949) 
Underweight 0.916 -0.092 
 (0.936) (1.087) 
Math - 4 0.184 0.437 
 (0.340) (0.573) 
Math - 3 -0.410 -0.150 
 (0.298) (0.459) 
ELA - 4 0.072 3.767*** 
 (0.473) (1.121) 
ELA - 3 -0.198 0.033 
 (0.375) (0.566) 
Female -0.252 0.668 
 (0.722) (1.089) 
Asian -0.097 0.111 
 (0.738) (1.720) 
Black 0.723 0.602 
 (0.684) (1.514) 
Hispanic 0.041 2.495* 
 (0.748) (1.360) 
Immigrant 0.255 -0.860 
 (0.491) (0.626) 
LEP 0.715 0.281 
 (0.688) (1.086) 
SPED -0.035 -0.419 
 (0.570) (0.907) 
School FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Observations 753 619 
R-squared 0.631 0.568 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Column 
1 includes schools that do not have UFM in the current year. Column 2 includes schools that have UFM 
in the current year. Samples include middle schools (schools that serve 7th graders) that ever have UFM 
in academic years 2006-2013.  
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Table A6. Placebo Test: Estimated Effect UFM Next Year on Academic and Weight Outcomes This Year, 2010-2013 
Panel A. Ever UFM and POS Students 
Panel B. Ever UFM and POS Students Not Offered UFM in Current Year 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by school (*p < .10. **p<.05. ***p<.01). Sample includes observations of Ever UFM 
students in 3rd-8th grade with POS data and at least two years of test scores and weight data from 2010-2013. All models include student fixed 
effects and grade-by-year fixed effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES zmath zELA Att_rate zBMI ln(BMI) Overwgt Obese Undrwgt LEP SPED SLP SBP 
             
UFM_next 0.033 0.000 -0.085 0.003 0.013 0.011 -0.004 -0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.028 -0.602 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.156) (0.007) (0.032) (0.018) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (1.617) (1.704) 
             
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Grd*Yr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.386*** 0.950*** 93.984*** 2.958*** -0.005 0.402*** 0.212*** 0.105*** 0.159*** 0.233*** 74.719*** 16.490*** 
 (0.106) (0.102) (0.677) (0.022) (0.101) (0.048) (0.037) (0.029) (0.017) (0.036) (3.750) (4.200) 
             
Observations 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 99,108 
Students 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 47,827 
Schools 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
R-squared 0.882 0.847 0.859 0.915 0.915 0.845 0.845 0.690 0.953 0.961 0.852 0.799 
UFM_next -0.215 -0.078 1.424 -0.018 -0.102 -0.089 -0.085 -0.050 0.013 0.043 -4.432 1.13 
 (0.263) (0.195) (1.755) (0.036) (0.179) (0.100) (0.085) (0.048) (0.082) (0.040) (6.412) (33.095) 
             
Student FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Grd*Yr FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.248*** 1.245*** 91.171*** 0.157 2.980*** 0.257 0.351 0.082 0.195** 0.131 68.424*** 57.883 
 (0.456) (0.441) (4.434) (0.830) (0.144) (0.263) (0.508) (0.125) (0.098) (0.104) (15.970) (35.294) 
             
Observations 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 12,258 
Students 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 10,497 
Schools 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
R-squared 0.972 0.964 0.959 0.981 0.982 0.962 0.957 0.913 0.985 0.989 0.961 0.935 
